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Abstract—Sparse code multiple access (SCMA) is a promising
air interface candidate technique for next generation mobile
networks. By introducing the Tent map in the Chaos theory,
we propose a novel physical layer transmission scheme with
codeword level interleaving at the transmitter in this letter, which
is termed as interleaver based SCMA (I-SCMA). Simulation
results and analysis show that I-SCMA can provide high security
performance without any loss in performance and transmission
rate, thus constitutes a viable solution for the next generation
wireless networks to provide secure communications.
Index Terms—5G; SCMA; secure transmission; interleaving.
I. INTRODUCTION
SCMA [1] is a code domain non-orthogonal multiple access(NOMA) scheme that is considered to be a promising
5G candidate due to its excellent ability to support massive
quantities of users under heavily loaded conditions.
In the possible application scenarios for SCMA, such as
massive machine type of communication (mMTC), millions of
nodes must be accessed. Since ubiquitous mobile devices are
required to be accessed to Internet of Things (IoT) in mMTC;
hence, unprecedented amount of private and sensitive data is
transmitted over wireless channels in an SCMA network. From
this perspective, the research on the secrecy issue of SCMA is
of significant importance. Moreover, owing to the requirements
such as ultra low latency and low power consumption for the
IoT, it is also challenging to ensure the security in such a
network.
Physical layer security (PLS) has been widely studied in
recent years [2]–[5], which is regarded as a promising supple-
ment to the cryptographic techniques. The first NOMA scheme
was defined on the power domain, and its secrecy outage
probability was derived in [6]. In [7], a secure transmission
scheme that maximizes the minimum confidential information
rate among users was proposed. In [8], we propose a secure
transmission scheme for downlink SCMA system with extra
phase rotations in the design of codebook, called randomized
constellation rotation based SCMA (RCR-SCMA). However,
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in that work, extra uplink and downlink communications
are necessary, and the randomized codebooks are not fully
optimized, thus the secure communication is achieved by
satisfying transmission rate with possible performance loss.
In this letter, we mainly focus on improving the com-
putational complexity for the eavesdropper to recover the
transmitted data, and thus achieving security for the system.
In consequent, a novel physical layer secure transmission
scheme with chaotic map and codeword level interleaving,
which is denoted as I-SCMA, is proposed. To ensure the
security, interleavers that are constructed according to the
channel phase with the association of Tent map in the Chaos
theory is introduced. The basic idea of I-SCMA is to amplify
the randomness of limited information that can be extracted
from the channel state information (CSI), and thus leading to
asymmetric knowledge between the legitimate users (LUs) and
eavesdropper in interleavers since they disperse the order of
codewords for each LU. From this perspective, the proposed
scheme can be regarded as a physical layer encryption, which
is a combination of conventional ciphers and physical layer
security. Therefore, the security of I-SCMA is guaranteed by
the unacceptable computational complexity at the eavesdrop-
per side.
The rest of this letter is organized as follow. Sec. II describes
the system model of I-SCMA. In Sec. III, the proposed I-
SCMA transmission scheme is discussed. Numerical results
and conclusion are presented in Sec. IV and Sec. V, respec-
tively.
II. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITH INTERLEAVER
The system model of I-SCMA along with the construction
of interleaver are presented in this section.
Fig. 1: Illustration of I-SCMA system with an external eavesdropper
2A. Interleaver based SCMA
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the uplink transmissions
where J single-antenna LUs transmit signal to the same base
station (BS) in the presence of an eavesdropper. We assume
that the eavesdropper is an external node, and the BS can
distinguish it from LUs, which can be simply realized via
authentication in practice. As for the SCMA transmitter, each
function element is allocated to df users, and each user
occupies du function elements. The encoder of I-SCMA is the
same as conventional SCMA (C-SCMA), which is defined by a
codebookXj that maps log2(C) binary bits to aK dimensional
complex codeword xj selected from the dedicated codebook
Xj corresponding to user j, where jXj j = C, and C is the size
of constellation.
At any transmission time, the received signal between single
LU and BS can be expressed as
yr(t) = hr(t)x(t) + n(t); (1)
where x(t) is the transmitted signal, hr(t) is the channel gain
and n(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise. Without loss
of generality, hr(t) can be modeled as a complex Gaussian
random variable, and its polar form is hr(t) = jhr(t)jejr(t),
where r(t) 2 [0; 2]. At each transmission time instant, the
BS and each LU perform channel estimation in the same
coherent interval and thus they can obtain the same r from
the CSI.
In I-SCMA, bj and b^j denote the coded information bits
and candidate decoded bits of user j, respectively, where the
code length is N . After encoding by the SCMA codebook
mapper, there are N= log2(C) codewords for each user. Sub-
sequently, the codewords are conveyed to the interleaver j
to scramble the sequences of codewords. Note that each user
utilizes a different interleaving pattern and each data block
can be encrypted with different j at different transmission
time so that the security can be enhanced. The construction
of interleaver will be demonstrated in the next subsection.
After the transmitted chips are received, a de-interleaver is
utilized before forward error correction (FEC) encoder. As
the BS estimates the channel in the same interval of each
user, it can recover the interleaving patterns utilized by LUs
and further attain the original transmitted data. It should be
noted that as a codeword level interleaver is applied and the
detection at the receiver is codeword by codeword; hence, the
received signals can be directly detected. Subsequently, the
de-interleaver should be utilized to the detected bits of each
user since the codewords are scrambled.
As can be observed from Fig. 1, the security of I-SCMA is
based on the channel interdependence, moreover, the channel
independence is amplified via Tent map for the eavesdropper
while the BS can recover the data since the CSI is assumed
to be unchanged within the coherent internal.
B. Interleaver construction
The key principle of I-SCMA is that the j is derived from
the CSI of each LU to BS; hence, j (j 2 1;    ; J) are unique
for different users. It should be noted that the interleaver in
this letter has different usage with the ones of Turbo codes
or interleave-division multiple-access (IDMA), it is utilized to
disperse the order of SCMA codewords and thus make the
detected bits unpredictable for the eavesdropper. As such, the
eavesdropper cannot recover the original messages without
the knowledge of interleaver, therefore, the security can be
ensured. As the channels are assumed to be independently,
and the Tent map can generate quasi-random sequences that
are irreversible, thus j are independent and random. In
consequent, the transmitted data can be fully scrambled by
the interleaver, i.e., the eavesdropper is unable to obtain any
information even though it can receive the signals transmitted
by LUs since the sequences of the data is different from
the original ones. It is obviously that the key of I-SCMA is
the construction of j , which requires sufficient randomness
subject to very limited information that can be used in r.
To construct an interleaver that can satisfy our demands, we
employ a Tent map in the Chaos theory [9], which can generate
a random sequence with a few initial parameters. The original
Tent map is expressed as follows:
f := minfx; 1  xg (2)
For the values of the parameter  2 [0; 2], f maps the unit
interval [0; 1] into itself, thus defining a recurrence relation.
In particular, iterating a given point x0 in [0; 1] gives rise to
a sequence xn:
xn+1 = f(xn) =

xn for xn < 12
(1  xn) for xn  12
(3)
Therefore, once the initial parameter  and x0 are given,
a random sequence take values that range from 0 to 1 can
be obtained. This is mainly due to the Tent map holds the
initial parameters within the given range define a dynamical
system and thus make the output from predictable to chaotic.
It should be noted that such a Tent map is irreversible, i.e., the
original input cannot be obtained even the generated sequence
is known to the eavesdropper.
Considering the range of r is [0; 2] while the range of
 and x0 are [0; 2] and [0; 1], respectively; hence, a mapping
from r to  and x0 have to be constructed. Note that there
exists numbers of such transformations and they are performed
locally and silently at BS and each LU such that no signals will
be radiated. Consequently, the eavesdropper cannot intercept
f and g. However, due to the sensitivity of  and x0 in the
Tent map, i.e., very minor variation of  and x0 can generate
a totally different sequence, and the robustness of I-SCMA,
f and g should have the ability to enlarge the digits of r,
which can further exploit the sensitivity of Tent map.
For the ease of implementation, we select two basic func-
tions, which can be written as:
j sinrj+ j cosrj = f : r !  (4)
and
1
2
(sinr + 1) = g : r ! x0 (5)
It is obviously that (4) and (5) can map r to the range
of initial parameter in (2). After the  and x0 are obtained,
substituting them into (2) and (3) yields a sequence with
certain length (equal to the number of symbols of each user).
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to an index of the transmitted codewords. For simplicity, the
construction of interleaver is given in Algorithm. 1:
Algorithm 1: Interleaver construction of I-SCMA
Output: Interleavers j
1 foreach transmission time do
2 LUs and BS start the channel estimation process;
3 LUs and BS obtain the channel phase r(t) from the
CSI;
4 Each LU uses their r(t) to calculate the initial
parameters in Tent mapping according to (4) and (5);
5 Each LU uses the generated  and x in last step to
generate a Chaos sequence according to (3);
6 Labling each block from 1 to N= log2 C;
7 Sorting the generated Chaos sequence and rearanging
the lable of each block according to the sorted order;
8 Each user generates their own interleaver j .
From the discussion above, inaccurate estimation will result
in catastrophic results. However, since the digits of channel
phase can be enlarged by f and g, the requiring accuracy
of extracted channel phase can be decreased. Furthermore,
numbers of secret key negotiation and correction techniques
are reported [10].
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Decrypted complexity of I-SCMA
The decryption complexity for an eavesdropper is a vital
secrecy performance metric. From the previous discussion, if
the eavesdroppers intend to intercept the data by guessing the
interleavers of each user, then the complexity equals to J 
(N= log2(C))!. Note that log2(C) equals to 2 and 4 typically.
Consequently, the search space S can be approximated as:
S = J  (N= log2(C))!  10n(lnn 1); (6)
where n = N= log2(C). As can be observed from (6), even if
the code length N is moderate, the computational complexity
is certainly unaffordable for the eavesdroppers.
In contrast to enumerate the interleavers as a random
attacker with brute force attack, another attacker model con-
sidered in this letter, called intelligent attacker [11] is able
to estimate the CSI with certain accuracy. However, they
still encounter the following difficulties: (i) According to
the feature of Tent map in the Chaos theory, the generated
sequences are very sensitive to the initial parameters  and
x0. As reported in [9], the variation of 10 digits after decimal
point can even generate totally different sequences. Therefore,
the intelligent attacker should have the ability to approximate
the CSI with extremely high accuracy. (ii) The mappings
from channel phase r to  and x0 are diverse, and the
mapping f and g are unknown to the eavesdroppers; hence,
it is impossible for the eavesdropper to intercept the initial
parameter that used to generate the interleavers even though
it can guess the channel phase with low margin. (iii) The
interleavers can be changed over a period time as the CSI
TABLE I: SEARCHING SPACE COMPARISON PER FRAME
Scheme
Order 4-point 16-point
Conventional SCMA nC  ( 360

) nC  ( 360

)
RCR-SCMA 4nC  ( 360

)4
 8
2
2
4nC  ( 360

)2
 4
2
2
I-SCMA JC  n! JC  n!
is time-varying, which can further enhance the security of I-
SCMA.
Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot recover the interleavers
to intercept the transmitted data as BS do even the CSI
can be estimated with certain accuracy since the pilots are
broadcasted
To demonstrate the advantages of I-SCMA, we also com-
pare the decryption complexity of RCR-SCMA and C-SCMA
with I-SCMA by using brute force searching. In Table. I, the
frame length equals to the code length N , C is the complexity
of MPA to detect a data block,  denotes the step size of
searching for a correct codebook. As reported in [8], the
security cannot be enhanced by further reducing  and thus
I-SCMA can achieve a better secrecy performance than C-
SCMA and RCR-SCMA in terms of decryption complexity.
B. Entropy Analysis of Post-processing Attack
Aiming at evaluating the performance of the post-processing
attacker (PPA) [11], we analyze the entropy of the received
signal at the PPA side (HPPA), and make comparison to the
entropy of transmitted messages (HT ).
We assume that each user is independent as the codewords
are interleaved to be uncorrelated, according to the definition
of entropy, for a message with N bits, HT equals to N .
Considering various sizes of codebook in C-SCMA, as for
a PPA, the codebook size should be judged at first; hence, the
calculation of the entropy is:
HPPA =   1
K
X
K
N
log2 Ck
KX
k=1
IkX
i=1

1
KIk

 log2

1
KIk

(7)
where K is the possible codebook size that the LUs can use;
Ck is the size of kth candidate codebook; Ik is the number
of all possible interleavers. For simplicity and considering the
worse scenario, we assume that the codebook size is known
to the eavesdropper, then (7) degenerates to:
HPPA =   N
log2 C
X
Ik

1
Ik

 log2

1
Ik

=
N
log2 C
 log2(Ik)
(8)
By applying the Stirling’s approximation, (7) can be further
written as:
HPPA 

N
log2 C
2
 log2
 p
2
e

N
log2 C
 3
2
!
(9)
Note that
p
2
e  1, therefore,
HPPA  3
2

N
log2 C
2
 log2

N
log2 C

(10)
In general, N  C, thus (10), HPPA  HT , which indicates
that the entropy of secret keys is larger than plaintext; hence,
the proposed I-SCMA can reach the perfect secrecy for PPA.
4TABLE II: BER PERFORMANCE OF EAVESDROPPER UNDER
CERTAIN ESTIMATED ACCURACY 2 = 0:04
Scheme
Eb=N0 5 dB 6 dB 7dB 8dB 9dB
BER 0.4970 0.4968 0.4982 0.4967 0.4977
SER 0.7454 0.7454 0.7461 0.7452 0.7455
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The simulation results and security analysis of the I-SCMA
are discussed in this section.
As noted in [8], [12], the error rate performance can be used
to assess the secrecy performance of a system, thus we evaluate
the error rate performance from the perspective of LUs and
eavesdropper, respectively, to demonstrate the validity of the
proposed scheme.
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Fig. 2: Error rate performance comparison of legitimate users and an
eavesdropper for I-SCMA
Average error rate comparisons of each user for 4-point, 16-
point I-SCMA and C-SCMA are shown in Fig. 2 (simulation
parameters K = 4; J = 6; df = 3; du = 2; max(Niter) =
6;  = 150%; N = 256 and code rate r = 0.5). As can be
seen from the figures, the performance of I-SCMA is slightly
better than C-SCMA especially in the high SNR region,
which indicates that I-SCMA will not suffer from performance
loss compare to the existing secure transmission for SCMA
in [8]. This is mainly because the interleavers disperse the
coded sequences so that the adjacent blocks are approximately
uncorrelated. Furthermore, it is clear that eavesdroppers cannot
obtain any information as they cannot estimate r with very
high accuracy and the mappers are unknown to them. Note
that the symbol error rate (SER) of I-SCMA for eavesdroppers
approximate to 0.75 and 0.94 for 4-point and 16-point I-
SCMA, respectively, which follows from the fact that each
symbol can be wrongly detected with probability:
Pr fxi 6= xg = C   1C (11)
In Table. II, the error rate performance of LUs under the
condition that the eavesdropper can approximate the CSI with
low error margin is presented. We assume that the estimated
r of eavesdropper follows the distribution ~r  N (r; 2).
As can be observed from the table, although the eavesdropper
can estimate the CSI with certain accuracy, the BER and SER
performance of the eavesdropper is still too high to detect the
correct transmitted information, which follows from the fact
that the Tent map is very sensitive to the input value. Note that
the results of 16-point I-SCMA are similar to 4-point I-SCMA.
By combining the higher layers cryptography, the eaves-
dropper would have to guess both the key and the random
interleavers introduced by the CSI, which leads to a significant
increase in the search space when performing cryptanalysis.
The proposed I-SCMA is a viable solution for secure trans-
missions in an SCMA network.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we propose a novel secure transmission
scheme for uplink SCMA system, which is called I-SCMA. As
indicated by the simulation results and analysis, I-SCMA can
achieve a good secrecy performance without any performance
loss. Furthermore, I-SCMA does not impose any overhead in
terms of extra uplink and downlink communications compared
to the existing physical layer security transmission schemes.
In conclusion, our scheme serves as a valuable supplement to
conventional cryptographic technologies.
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